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Who turned their back on the SPD? 
Electoral disaffection with the German Social Democratic Party 
and the Hartz reforms 
 
Baptiste FRANÇON1 
March 1, 2013 
 
Abstract: This paper proposes an empirical analysis of the declining support for the German 
Social Democratic Party (SPD) during Schröder government’s second term of office, which 
was marked by major reforms in the fields of unemployment insurance and labour market 
policy (Hartz reforms). Drawing on a panel of West Germans, we provide evidence that this 
disaffection was strongly related to a worker’s occupation and that it involved electoral 
backlash from core blue-collar constituencies of the SPD. In comparison, the impact of other 
socio-economic characteristics such as the labour market status or the income was less 
pronounced. We further show that discontent grew stronger among occupations where the 
risk of unemployment was more prevalent. This suggests that opposition to specific measures 
that weakened status-securing principles of the unemployment insurance substantially drove 
electoral disaffection with the SPD during this period. 
Keywords: political economy, economics of voting, social policy preferences, unemployment 
insurance, social-democracy, Germany 
JEL Codes: P16, J65, D72 
 
Qui s’est détourné du SPD ? 
Le déclin électoral du parti social-démocrate allemand et les lois Hartz 
Résumé: Cet article propose une analyse empirique du déclin dans le soutien au parti social-
démocrate allemand (SPD) pendant le second mandat du gouvernement Schröder, marqué 
par la mise en œuvre de réformes majeures dans le champ de l’assurance chômage et des 
politiques de l’emploi (réformes Hartz). En exploitant les données d’un panel d’Allemands de 
l’Ouest, nous montrons que ce déclin est fortement lié à la profession et qu’il s’est traduit par 
un recul prononcé du soutien émanant de l’électorat ouvrier traditionnel du SPD. En 
comparaison, l’impact d’autres facteurs socio-économiques tels que le statut dans l’emploi ou 
le revenu sont plus marginaux. Nous montrons par ailleurs que le mécontentement a été plus 
fort parmi les professions où le risque de chômage est plus élevé. Ces résultats suggèrent que 
l’opposition à certaines mesures qui ont affaibli les principes de sécurisation du statut au 
cœur du système d’indemnisation explique une part substantielle de la perte de popularité 
enregistrée par le SPD pendant cette période.  
Mots-clés: économie politique, économie du vote, préférences pour les politiques sociales, 
assurance chômage, social-démocratie, Allemagne 
JEL Codes: P16, J65, D72  
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1. Introduction 
 
Traditional partisanship approaches in political economy expect leftist governments to oppose 
welfare state retrenchment, in order to satisfy the strong preferences for welfare policies of 
their constituencies (Korpi and Palme, 2003). However, this argument has been challenged by 
recent contributions that emphasise the emergence of an insider-outsider cleavage within the 
labour force since the 1980’s. According to this thesis, the rise in the share of workers with 
atypical contracts (outsiders) has exacerbated distributional conflicts between workers, and 
eventually weakened the support for welfare policies. Conflicts pertaining to unemployment 
insurance (UI) are expected to be particularly salient, as workers in standard employment 
(insiders) disproportionally contribute to its funding, whereas they are already insured against 
unemployment by the high employment protection associated with their status (Saint-Paul, 
1996, 2000; Rueda 2005, 2007). 
 
In this paper, we argue that the insider-outsider cleavage does not play a crucial role in 
shaping individual preferences for welfare state retrenchment. Indeed, numerous factors can 
prevent the insider-outsider cleavage from becoming politically relevant. First, outsiders will 
not differ from insiders if they expect to become insiders themselves (Emmenegger, 2009) or 
if they share the advantages of secure employment through their marital status (Pierson, 
2001). Furthermore, the employment legislation does not fully protect insiders against lay-
offs. It is therefore likely that insiders working in declining industries should also support 
generous unemployment policies. In this regard, occupation can be considered as a better 
predictor of unemployment prospects than labour market status (Häusermann and Schwander, 
2012). The importance of occupational unemployment rates in shaping social policy 
preferences is indeed well established (Iversen and Soskice, 2001; Cusack et al., 2006; Rehm, 
2009, 2011). 
 
To back our argument, we investigate the attitudes of a panel of West Germans toward the so-
called Hartz reform, a major and emblematic reform of the German public UI (2003-2005). 
This reform generated a great deal of attention from both public and academic circles, as it 
involved a deep recalibration of and significant cuts in unemployment benefits. The fact that it 
was promoted by the leftist Social Democratic Party (SPD) was also a noticeable feature of 
the reform. Drawing on comprehensive information from the Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), 
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we analyse the socio-economic determinants that drive individual preferences for the reform, 
identified by the variation in the support for the SPD during its implementation. 
 
Our empirical results differ from important claims of the literature building on the insider-
outsider cleavage. First, we do not find significant political discrepancies between insiders 
and outsiders in their support for the reform. In particular, workers in open-ended contracts 
were equally opposed to the reform as workers in atypical employment. Besides, we find the 
support for the reform to strongly vary with a worker’s occupation; we provide evidence that 
this is because occupational unemployment rates shape preferences for the reform. Second, 
we find that skilled blue-collar workers were especially reluctant to the reform, although they 
were traditionally a strong constituency of the SPD. This challenges the view under which the 
design of the Hartz reform broadly preserved the core interests of insiders from the 
manufacturing sector (Clegg, 2007; Palier and Thelen, 2010). On the contrary, this indicates 
that the Hartz reform was detrimental to them, in particular because it weakened former 
status-securing principles of the German UI (such as narrow criteria for job suitability and 
earnings-related benefits for long-term unemployed). This result contributes to the literature 
on welfare state reform, as it suggests that the Hartz reform was an episode of partial 
liberalisation (Streeck, 2009, pp. 61-65) rather than one of welfare state dualisation (Palier 
and Martin, 2008; Palier, 2010; Emmenegger et al., 2012). 
 
This paper is organised as follows. Next section quickly reviews the main contributions of the 
literature building on the insider-outsider cleavage. Section 3 details the major features of the 
Hartz reform and outlines its political context. Section 4 presents the data and the estimation 
strategy. Section 5 analyses the main results, while robustness checks and secondary results 
are presented in Section 6. Last section concludes. 
 
2. Unemployment insurance reform and the insider-outsider cleavage 
 
In its original formulation, the insider-outsider theory has primarily focused on the role of 
labour turnover costs in the wage bargaining process (Lindbeck and Snower, 1989). 
Nonetheless, this terminology has been increasingly used in the recent political economy 
literature to oppose workers in standard employment to those unemployed or in atypical 
employment. Atypical employment includes various employment relationships, such as part-
time work, fixed-term contracts and agency work. These atypical contracts have been 
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gradually introduced since the 1980s, or equivalently their use by employers has been eased. 
The increase of the share of atypical jobs in the labour force was a salient feature of recent 
labour markets trends in Europe (on Germany see Eichhorst and Marx, 2011). 
 
In this section, we briefly present two strands of literature that analyse the insider-outsider 
cleavage as a core determinant of recent UI reforms: firstly, the insider-outsider politics thesis 
that studies how the labour market status might shape individual preferences for UI; secondly, 
the welfare dualisation thesis that emphasises the role of political meta-actors such as unions 
in recent episodes of welfare state retrenchment in Europe. 
 
2.1. The insider-outsider politics thesis 
 
Departing from the literature that emphasises the importance of income in shaping welfare 
policy preferences (Meltzer and Richard, 1981), many studies actually suggest that the 
insurance motive fundamentally drives the political attitudes toward social protection (Wright, 
1986; Moene and Wallerstein, 2001; Iversen and Soskice, 2001). In this framework, workers 
primarily perceive social protection as a way to maintain their income in the event of job loss 
(unemployment, sickness, retirement…). This might be particularly relevant in the case of UI, 
where most benefits are earnings-related and therefore perform horizontal (from high-risk 
toward low-risk individuals) rather than vertical redistribution (from poor toward rich people). 
The workers’ exposure to unemployment thus appears as an important determinant of 
preferences for unemployment benefits. In line with this framework, proponents of the 
insider-outsider politics thesis define the labour market status as the prominent factor 
influencing one’s unemployment risk, and in turn in shaping one’s preferences for UI (Saint-
Paul, 1996, 2000; Rueda 2005, 2007). 
 
According to David Rueda (2005), insiders have broadly become insulated from 
unemployment in two ways. First, they benefit from the strong employment protection 
legislation (EPL) associated with open-ended full-time positions. Furthermore, they have 
become less exposed to business cycles, because outsiders act as a buffer in case of economic 
downturns. Indeed, the latter are not covered by equivalently strong EPL, with regard to 
redundancies costs or legal limitations of lay-off for instance. Insiders and outsiders should 
therefore have conflicting views about job security regulation and labour market policy. On 
the one hand, insiders want to preserve the EPL associated with their status, while outsiders 
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conceive strong EPL as a barrier to their entry on the labour market. On the other hand, 
insiders want to contain UI expenditures because they disproportionally contribute to their 
funding, while outsiders support generous unemployment benefits as they experience frequent 
unemployment spells. This cleavage appears especially problematic for social democratic 
parties, as they are facing with antagonist demands from their traditional constituencies. 
Nevertheless, Rueda claims that they will prioritise insiders’ over outsiders’ demands, 
because of the electoral and institutional weight of the former. In that respect, left parties 
should support UI retrenchment in a context of increasing fiscal pressure and/or international 
competition. 
 
While Emmenegger (2009) has questioned the validity of the insider-outsider cleavage with 
respect to individual preferences for job security regulation, we focus in this paper on the 
determinants of preferences for unemployment benefits, drawing on some of his arguments. 
We distinguish between two sets of reasons that should lead insiders and outsiders to have 
comparable preferences for unemployment benefits. First, we argue that the labour market 
status is often not a stable characteristic of workers; forward-looking individuals might 
therefore consider that it only marginally contributes to their unemployment risk. Fixed-term 
contracts, for instance, are extensively used by employers to screen young workers and will 
eventually lead to an insider status (Blanchard and Landier, 2002). On the contrary, 
permanent contract does not entirely prevent from being made redundant; insiders in 
declining industries should reasonably fear about their job security, even if they enjoy strong 
EPL. Second, there are strong obstacles that impede the rise of an autonomous political 
demand from outsiders; the fact that the outsider status is transitory for many workers implies 
that they might not be able to collectively organise around their specific interests; moreover, 
many outsiders are economically dependent on an insider partner or parent, and are thus 
prompt to support insiders’ interests (Pierson 2001, p. 448). This might be particularly 
relevant in “conservative” European countries like Germany where atypical employment 
essentially results from female employment in a traditional breadwinner family model 
(Giesecke, 2009). 
 
By many aspects, the occupational status appears as a more stable and better predictor of a 
worker’s exposure to unemployment than the labour market status (Häusermann and 
Schwander, 2012). Because they are based on skills that are hard to acquire and not easily 
transferable, there is indeed low mobility between occupational groups. Furthermore, the 
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occupation is an important determinant of a worker's unemployment risk, as job scarcity, 
technical change and/or outsourcing should similarly affect workers with comparable sets of 
skills. Finally, there is a strong social identity attached to occupations, as trade unions have 
been traditionally organised around them. This implies that individuals working in the same 
occupation are likely to share similar social policy preferences. Recent contributions have 
indeed found occupational unemployment rates to be a strong predictor of welfare policy 
preferences for redistribution (Cusack et al., 2006; Rehm, 2009) and for UI generosity (Rehm, 
2011). 
 
2.2. The welfare state dualisation thesis 
 
Drawing on an industrial relations perspective, the welfare state dualisation thesis also 
emphasises the role of the insider-outsider cleavage in recent UI reforms (Palier and Martin, 
2008; Palier, 2010; Emmenegger et al., 2012). This literature builds on the assumption that 
unions are key players in the welfare state retrenchment process, particularly in European 
countries with Bismarckian welfare states where social partners are directly involved in the 
administration of social protection regimes. In this framework, unions will oppose reforms 
that jeopardise insiders’ interests, because these workers constitute their core clientele. 
However, they will support cost containment reforms targeted at outsiders, to guarantee the 
financial sustainability of social protection regimes without further increase in social 
contributions. In the case of labour market policy, this “dualised” reform path implies that 
outsiders were de facto excluded of UI schemes through stricter eligibility requirements and 
shorter compensation duration; in parallel, new schemes of flat-rate means-tested social 
assistance were introduced, but only offering a minimal safety net for outsiders (Clegg, 2007; 
Palier and Thelen, 2010). 
 
A questionable claim, though, is whether this reform trend only marginally affects insiders, 
and especially workers from the manufacturing sector, by whom unions’ membership rates 
are the highest. It is indeed the case that workers with long and unbroken work history will 
still receive generous unemployment benefits, would they become unemployed. But this 
reform pattern also challenges former status-securing features of the UI that insiders were the 
only ones to enjoy. By reducing the compensation duration and levelling down the generosity 
of the social assistance received after benefit exhaustion, it increases the threat of social 
decline in case of prolonged unemployment. Contra Palier and Thelen (2010, p. 136), we 
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argue that this evolution is particularly problematic for skilled blue-collar workers. First, the 
unemployment risk of these workers is far from negligible, in a general economic context of 
deindustrialisation. Moreover, they have a low probability of finding an equivalent job in 
terms of income after a dismissal. This type of workers are indeed characterised by the fact 
that they own specific skills, which are not easily transferable from one job to another. Hence, 
this group should have high preferences for status-securing benefits, because they are looking 
to insure their specific asset (Iversen and Soskice, 2001). 
 
3. The Hartz reform 
 
3.1. A reform targeted at outsiders? 
 
The Hartz reform consisted of four packages of measures spread from 2003 to 2005, during 
the second term of office of the SPD-Green coalition. They entailed substantial changes in 
various areas of the unemployment policy, such as the creation of single gateways for the 
benefit and employment administrations, the development of new training programmes or the 
introduction of government-sponsored jobs (the infamous Ein-Euro-Jobs). Hartz IV, passed in 
December 2003 and implemented in January 2005, was the most controversial and high 
profile of these packages. Prior to Hartz IV, there were three benefits schemes for 
unemployed; unemployed filling the eligibility requirements in terms of past contributions 
were entitled to earnings-related benefits from the unemployment insurance; once their rights 
were exhausted, they could still enjoy earnings-related benefits from the unemployment 
assistance (at a lower replacement rate though), virtually for an unlimited period of time; only 
unemployed without entitlements to UI benefits had to rely on flat-rate means-tested social 
assistance. Hence, the underpinning logic of this system was mainly one of occupational 
status maintenance that secured workers’ standard of living, a typical trait of “conservative” 
welfare states (Esping-Andersen, 1999). Their status was also protected through narrow 
criteria for work suitability, as unemployed in these schemes were not obliged to accept jobs 
under conventional wages. 
 
While the German UI has therefore been traditionally “dualised”, in the sense that only 
insiders with long contribution records were entitled to generous benefits, it is not obvious 
that the Hartz reform increased this dual character (as already observed by Anke Hassel, see 
Stephens et al., 2012, p. 97). Some features were arguably especially detrimental to workers 
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experiencing frequent spells of unemployment. The necessary contributions for UI benefits 
were now calculated on the 2 years preceding dismissal (3 years before), strengthening the 
eligibility requirements. Unemployment assistance was merged with social assistance into a 
new flat-rate means-tested benefit, which implied significant benefit cuts for about two thirds 
of the unemployed that formerly depended on these schemes (Goebel and Richter, 2012). This 
suggests that one third of the beneficiaries were better-off after the reform, but their monetary 
gains were marginal in comparison. Furthermore, their situation worsened as criteria of work 
suitability were strengthened and sanctions in case of job refusal were increased. Beside, this 
reform also broke with status-securing principles constitutive of the German UI and therefore 
harmed better-off workers, as we argue. The maximum compensation duration for old 
unemployed with long contribution records was reduced to 18 months, whereas it was of 36 
months before, a feature that was extensively used as a bridge to early retirement (Trampusch, 
2005). The standard of living of middle and high-income groups was also no longer 
guaranteed by earnings-related benefits in case of prolonged unemployment. The new 
assistance scheme did not preserve them from social decline either, as references to 
conventional wages were removed from the criteria of work suitability. 
 
3.2. Political context 
 
The Hartz reform was implemented during the second term of office of the SPD-Green 
coalition, which was re-elected in September 2002. At this time, the situation on the labour 
market was highly problematic, the unemployment rate having reached its highest peak since 
the reunification. It was also a salient issue in public eyes because the fight against 
unemployment had already been a prominent theme in the first campaign of Chancellor 
Gerhard Schröder. Moreover, the government had to deal with financial pressures at the 
federal and local level (Streeck and Trampusch, 2005; Hassel and Schiller, 2010a, b). While 
these external constraints increased incentives for the government to take action, the Hartz 
reform was also part of a deliberate ‘Third Way’ strategy from the SPD. Welfare state 
retrenchment was an essential feature of this programmatic shift, a view endorsed by Schröder 
himself in the Blair-Schröder manifesto of 1999. The rationale underpinning this strategy was 
to enhance the support among middle-class voters, expecting these electoral gains to outweigh 
the losses by traditional constituencies of the SPD. The absence of a credible left competitor 
in the first place also reinforced the attractiveness of such a strategy, as the SPD could expect 
to minimise its losses among disappointed voters (Picot, 2009). However, this electoral 
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strategy did not prove to be successful for the SPD. It suffered its worst electoral outcomes 
since the post-war years in subsequent elections, notably because part of its members 
withdrew from the SPD to create a new left wing party (Die Linke) that could capitalise on the 
reform opponents’ vote. Furthermore, the reform remained a controversial legacy for the SPD, 
as the benefits calculation rule for social assistance was eventually declared unconstitutional 
by the German Federal Constitutional Court in 2010. 
 
Although the unions’ umbrella association was publicly critical of the reform, some authors 
put forward their ambiguity during the legislative process, suggesting that the reform 
highlighted potential divisions within and between unions (Carlin and Soskice, 2009; Palier 
and Thelen, 2010). Threats of general strikes were indeed rapidly abandoned and most of the 
demonstrations that took place during the legislative process involved civil society actors 
(especially unemployed support groups in East Germany). But the absence of radical 
opposition from the unions needs also to be nuanced as German industrial relations are 
traditionally built on consensus. It is therefore not obvious that they had the organisational 
resources to set up massive protests against the government, in particular against their 
historical partner. Eventually, opposition from the unions took other forms, as part of their 
members became active founder of Die Linke (Hassel and Schiller, 2010a, p. 98). 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
 
4.1. The partisanship variable 
 
Treating the Hartz reform as a quasi-experiment, this paper investigates individual attitudes 
toward UI reforms, identified by the variation in the support for the SPD during the reform 
implementation. To that end, we use the longitudinal German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) 
in our empirical analysis. This panel gives us information on various characteristics at the 
individual level: in particular, it allows us to explore which socio-economic dimension, labour 
market status or occupation, best explain the support for (or the opposition to) the reform. 
More critically, it also provides us with information on party identification, the dependent 
variable in our regressions. This partisanship variable is based upon two subsequent 
questions. In a first step, respondents are being asked: 
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‘Many people in Germany are inclined to a certain political party, although from time to time 
they vote for another political party. What about you: Are you inclined — generally speaking 
— to a particular party?’ 
 
Then in a second step, they indicate which party they support (if they answered positively to 
the first question). The wording of the first question emphasises the duration of the attachment 
to a particular party. The partisanship variable is therefore likely to reflect overall agreement 
with the main political orientations of this party.2 It is especially relevant for our estimation 
strategy: the reform was indeed the cornerstone of a major shift in the political agenda of the 
SPD, so that we expect a decline in the identification with the SPD from people who oppose 
the reform. On the contrary, this partisanship variable should not capture the influence of 
transitory factors, such as the charisma of party leaders or minor deviations from a party’s 
political agenda. Thus, it provides a better measure of preferences for the reform than a classic 
indicator of voting intentions. 
 
Figure 1 displays some descriptive statistics about the evolution of this partisanship variable 
over time for West Germans of voting age. For every year, it depicts the respective proportion 
of supporters of each of the five major parties (among individuals who declared a party 
inclination). As stated earlier, our variable should not be confused with voting intentions; this 
is why it does not reflect actual votes at the time of Federal elections (the vertical lines in 
Figure 1). This figure shows that smaller parties typically have a small share of loyal 
supporters among their voters, as the proportion of the former is always way below the scores 
they achieved in Federal Elections. Conversely, the two major parties have a relative higher 
share of loyal supporters compared to the votes they receive in Federal Election. Of particular 
interest in Figure 1 is the substantial decline in SPD support during the second term of the 
coalition (2003-2005), with its three worst scores since 1991, a drop we ascribe to the 
implementation of the Hartz reform. The fact that we do not observe an equivalent drop in the 
support for the Green Party indicates that the SPD was largely held responsible for the reform. 
This is in line with the fact that this party played the leading role in public eyes: the 
Chancellor took publicly credit for it and legislative work was subordinated to the Ministry of 
                                                 
2
 The stability of the partisanship for the two major parties (SPD and CDU/CSU) is indeed important. Using 
SOEP’s longitudinal design, Zuckerman and Kroh (2006, p. 73) notably show that most people do not deviate 
from one major party to another, only 7% of the respondents doing so on a 10 years period (prior to the 
implementation of the Hartz reform). 
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Work and Economy and the Ministry of Finance, affiliated to the SPD as well. This is also 
why we choose to focus on the evolution of the support for the SPD in our regressions.3 
 
Figure 1   Evolution of the support for the main political parties in West Germany (1991-
2008) 
 
Sample: SOEP, West German citizens, adult population. Author’s calculations. 
 
Finally, Figure 1 displays the share of respondents that declare party identification (dashed 
line), whatever this party is. Again, it does not reflect actual turnout rates at Federal Elections 
(about 80% over this period in West Germany), as the partisanship variable presumes a 
stronger attachment to a party than voting intentions. The overall support tends to be cyclical 
and increases around every Federal Elections, electoral campaigns typically rising the 
immediate interest for politics. Worth noticing is also the relative lower rates of party 
identification during the reform implementation. While it arguably reflects the contemporary 
drop in SPD support, we cannot exclude that other parties also lost supporters in the reform 
process.4 This point is discussed more thoroughly in the results section. 
 
4.2. Estimation strategy 
 
Our main sample of interest covers a period from the first Federal election after German 
Reunification (December 1990) to the end of the second term of the SPD-Green coalition 
                                                 
3
 Note that our main results remain when we analyse the variation in the cumulated support for the two parties 
that were in power (see Table A1.5 in Appendix 5). 
4
 The right-wing CDU had a majority in the Federal Council (Bundesrat) during the reform implementation, but 
did not use its veto power and might therefore also have been held responsible for the reform.  
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(September 2005).5 We only consider the active population from the private sector in our 
regressions, as we focus in this paper on the relationship between preferences for the Hartz 
reform and the unemployment risk attached to one’s labour market status or occupation. Thus, 
our sample does not include inactive people and workers from the public sector. While the 
latter are almost fully protected against redundancy by their status, there are concerns that 
other factors might drive their political preferences for the reform. In particular, one could 
argue that civil servants might be worried about the decrease of the public sphere of influence 
induced by this episode of welfare state retrenchment.6 
 
The support for the reform is identified by the variation in the support for the SPD during its 
implementation, using a dummy that takes the value one from March 2003 to September 
2005, and zero otherwise. We choose this time span in order to isolate the political impact of 
the most controversial features of the reform.7 The lower bound corresponds to the Agenda 
2010 speech by Chancellor Schröder, who publicly announced that the reform would also 
result in strong cuts in UI benefits duration and in unemployment assistance level. While the 
eventuality of merging unemployment and social assistance had already been discussed by the 
Hartz Commission, this was the first time that such drastic cuts were officially brought to 
public attention by the government (Hassel and Schiller, 2010a, p. 105). We do not consider 
the period subsequent to the 2005 Federal Election, as the agreement to a coalition with the 
right-wing CDU might also have altered the public perception of the SPD. Still, it is highly 
plausible that the low rates of support for the SPD after the reform reflect its long-lasting 
political effect (Figure 1). 
 
We limit our analysis to West German voters because our estimation strategy is not suitable 
for East Germans. While we rely on the variation in SPD partisanship to identify which social 
                                                 
5
 The SOEP actually starts in 1984 but we restrict our sample to the post-reunification area in order to prevent 
political considerations about the reunification process to interfere with our results. Our main results hold with 
an extended sample (1984-2005, available upon request). See below the results for a shorter time span (1998-
2005). 
6
 We actually find public servants to have been significantly opposed to the reform (result not displayed here, 
available upon request). This comes in contradiction with Rueda (2005), where civil servants are classified as 
insiders and are thus expected to support UI reforms. 
7
 The first two packages of the Hartz reform had already been voted at the end of 2002, but mainly implied 
administrative restructuring of the employment public service, a feature that we do not expect to be highly 
salient or controversial. Also note that we rule out the possibility that part of the variation we observe can be 
ascribed to long-standing effect of the 2001 “Riester” pension reform, another high-profile reform from the SPD, 
because it did not have a substantial political impact in the first place, as one can see from Figure 1.  
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groups were the most reluctant to the reform, it is likely that a large number of its potential 
opponents in East Germany were long-term supporters of the leftist PDS (the successor of the 
former Communist Party): indeed, the PDS and the SPD had very similar levels of support 
among East Germans prior to the reform, according to our partisanship variable (see Figure 
A1.1 in Appendix 6). This might in turn blur our results, as the variation in the SPD support 
would not be substantial enough to correctly identify which group defected during the reform 
implementation.8 We do not have similar concerns in the case of West Germany: the Green 
Party apart, there was not an equivalent left competitor for the SPD during our period of 
analysis (the radical left party Die Linke was only founded short before the 2005 Federal 
Election). 
 
4.3. Model and main explanatory variables 
 
We estimate Heckman Probit Selection Models in our regressions in order to address the two-
step design of our dependent variable. Indeed, we only observe identification with the SPD 
for individuals who first acknowledge an inclination toward a political party, whereas these 
two outcomes are not necessarily independent. There are concerns that individuals with a 
party identification (with the SPD or any other party) are selected on unobservable 
characteristics, what could in turn bias our estimates if we used a simple Probit model. The 
Heckman Probit Selection Model takes into account the possibility that the error terms of the 
two equations are jointly distributed. A correlation factor (rho-statistic) is then estimated that 
indicates the strength of the relationship between both dependent variables. Formally, we 
estimate the following system of two equations: 
 {                                                                                                                                                              
 
Where    represents the (latent) propensity to support any political party and   the (latent) 
propensity to support the SPD. Socio-economic characteristics depicting the individual’s 
labour market status (      ) and occupation (     ) are then introduced in the right hand 
                                                 
8
 We present regression results of our main models for the East German population in Table A1.8 (Appendix 5). 
The results are mostly inconclusive, as expected. Only unemployed seem to have been particularly reluctant to 
the reform according to these tables. This is consistent with the fact that East German unemployed support 
groups opposed a strong resistance to the reform, notably through the revival of the Montagsdemo, a reference to 
the demonstrations against the Communist regime at the end of the 1980s. 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.19
14 
 
side of our regressions and interacted with the       dummy to examine possible political 
discrepancies during the implementation of the reform.9   and    represent vectors of 
controls, where some of them are only included in    in order to meet exclusion restriction 
requirements. 
 
Five broad categories are defined for the labour market status: unemployment, atypical 
employment, full-time permanent employment, regular part-time employment (open-ended) 
and self-employment. The atypical employment category includes all individuals working in a 
fixed-term contracts (part- or full-time) and agency work. It also includes workers in Mini-
Jobs, a precarious form of contracts for low-paid, mostly part-time, employment, which does 
not give entitlements to UI benefits. With regard to the insider-outsider literature, the atypical 
employment and unemployed categories are outsiders’ groups, individuals in full-time 
permanent employment being the insiders (and the reference category), and self-employed an 
“upscale” group with very low preferences for UI (Rueda, 2005). We define a distinct 
category for regular part-time employment (open-ended), because this is a historically stable 
form of employment in Germany related to a traditional breadwinner family model, and 
should therefore be distinguished from atypical employment. 
 
For the occupation, we use detailed self-reported information (11 categories) that we merge 
into six categories: skilled and unskilled blue-collar workers (BC workers), skilled and 
unskilled white-collar workers (WC workers) and managers/executives; the last category 
again includes self-employed, as it characterises both a labour market status and an 
occupation. Unskilled occupations are defined as occupations which do not necessitate 
qualification or extensive on-the-job training, contrary to skilled occupations that necessitate 
qualification or vocational training.10 The skilled BC workers’ category is defined as the 
reference category in our regressions because it is one of the most numerous classes. 
Moreover, they have a central position in the German political economy. They were a core 
element of the social pact in the post-war years and the inheritance of specific political 
resources give them a disproportionate weight in the political sphere, in particular because 
they are strongly unionised. In this view, this category is often considered as the typical 
                                                 
9
 Some authors (Ai and Norton, 2003; Norton et al., 2004) argue that this linear approximation can lead to errors 
in the sign and statistical significance of the interaction terms. Building on their methodology, we have 
computed marginal effects for our interaction terms but we did not find any substantial difference with our 
results (see Table A1.4 in Appendix 4). 
10
 See Appendix 1 for the exact definition of the 11 occupational classes. 
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insiders within the German model by proponents of the welfare dualisation thesis (Palier and 
Thelen, 2010). 
 
4.4. Additional controls 
 
Beside the labour market status and the occupation, we introduce standard demographic 
controls (age, sex) in the SPD support equation. We also control for the household pre-tax 
income, a classic determinant of political polarisation. Furthermore, we include a dummy for 
unions’ membership, which measures the degree of working class consciousness. It is likely 
to increase the support for the SPD, given the strong historical ties between unions and the 
Social Democrats in Germany. 
 
The selection equation includes controls commonly used in the political science literature 
discussing the participation to politics. We control for the age to take into account the length 
of exposure to democratic institutions, and for the age squared to control for a possible 
quadratic relation. Two further controls measure political exposure. First, we include a 
measure of the temporal distance to the closest election, which allows us to capture the peaks 
in the identification rate induced by electoral campaigns. Moreover, we use a subjective 
measure of the individual’s interest in politics. We also introduce some measures of social 
embeddedness, which should lead to a greater participation in politics: marriage, union 
membership, the frequency to involve in volunteer work or to visit friends and relatives. 
Finally, we also control for the household pre-tax income as participation to politics is 
economically costly.  
 
5. Main results 
 
In Table 1 we display results from two Heckman Probit regressions that test the empirical 
relevance of political divides across two socio-economic dimensions, namely the labour 
market status and the occupation. In this section, we are primarily interested in the 
coefficients from the second step of the estimation because they have a straightforward 
interpretation (columns 1 and 3). They indicate which individual characteristics determine the 
support for the SPD among West Germans who declare an attachment to a political party. In 
particular, the analysis of the “Hartz-interacted” terms allows us to assess which socio-
economic groups turned away from the SPD as it implemented the Hartz reform. 
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Additionally, we report the coefficients from the first step of the Heckman Probit estimation 
for each model (columns 2 and 4). They give us information about the variation in the overall 
party identification as the reform was implemented. We can infer from these estimates 
whether competitors from the SPD were also affected by the reform process, i.e. whether the 
reform caused a general disaffection with all main parties. However, we will remain cautious 
in their interpretation: it is not obvious that the observed variation can be solely ascribed to 
the reform political impact, as the other main parties had their own political agenda. 
 
5.1. Political divides across labour market statuses 
 
Model 1 provides a first test of the empirical relevance of the insider-outsider cleavage at the 
micro-level. Looking at the coefficients from the SPD support equation in column 1, we see 
that all of our controls have a high significant impact on this support over the period of 
analysis. In particular, union membership is associated with a positive impact on SPD 
support. As expected, individuals with a lower household income are also more supportive. 
Furthermore, Model 1 includes the categorical variable depicting the labour market status and 
its interaction with the Hartz dummy. The corresponding coefficients should be interpreted as 
follows: the non-interacted coefficients represent the political discrepancy of each labour 
market status category relatively to the reference category (permanent full-time job) prior to 
the Hartz reform; in addition, we can infer from the interacted coefficients how these 
discrepancies evolved during the reform implementation. 
 
According to our estimates, there is some evidence that the labour market status determines 
the propensity to support the SPD prior to the reform: individuals in unemployment, part-time 
and self-employment were significantly less prone to support the SPD than insiders. Looking 
now at the interaction terms, we do not find evidence of a political response to the reform in 
line with the insider-outsider politics thesis. The overall effect given by the Hartz dummy is 
negative and very significant, suggesting that most of our categories, including insiders, were 
reluctant to the reform. However, coefficients for unemployed and atypically employed fail to 
achieve significance, being even positive for unemployed: this implies that outsiders were not 
more inclined than insiders to oppose unemployment insurance retrenchment. Only self-
employed individuals exhibit a relative support to the reform, the coefficient for their 
interaction term being positive and highly significant.  
 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.19
17 
 
Estimates from the overall party identification equation lead us to moderate some of our 
previous conclusions (column 2). The negative and significant coefficient on the Hartz 
dummy suggests that the drop in the SPD support broadly translated into political 
“abstention” from their former supporters. Focusing on the coefficients for the interaction 
terms, we see that they are all negative, but only significant for the unemployed and the 
regular part-time workers. This means that individuals belonging to these two categories were 
more likely than insiders to lose their party attachment during the reform implementation 
(whatever this party was). This effect is particularly strong for unemployed people, but as 
stated above it cannot be ascribed to a larger drop in the SPD support; this implies that 
competitors from the SPD also lost support from the unemployed in the reform process. 
Transferring Hirschman’s (1970) conceptual framework to our analysis, this effect can be 
interpreted as an ‘exit’ option, in opposition to the ‘voice’ option that consists in picking 
another party to express one’s aversion to the reform. In the case of West German 
unemployed, we can relate this ‘exit’ choice to the fact that none of the main parties was 
likely to go back over the cuts in long-term unemployment benefits.11 On the contrary, 
employed individuals might have expected that electoral punishment would eventually bring 
political parties to reconsider some features of the reform that were the most detrimental to 
them. These expectations proved to be realistic, as the duration of unemployment insurance 
benefits was again extended at up to 24 months for older workers by the Grand Coalition 
government in 2008. 
 
The significant negative effect for workers in regular part-time is puzzling; again, it does not 
reflect a larger decrease in the SPD support for this category, but we do not believe that it 
results from the same ‘exit’ logic as for unemployed either. Finally, we do not find outsiders 
in atypical employment to differ significantly from insiders in their overall party 
identification. This further suggests that this category did not have a particularly stronger 
aversion to the Hartz reform. 
  
                                                 
11
 Eventually, the left radical party Die Linke provided a ‘voice’ option for unemployed interests. Using the 
SOEP dataset, Kroh and Siedler (2008, p. 630) show that West-German unemployed have indeed become one of 
their core constituency. 
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Table 1   Socio-economic determinants of the support for the Hartz reform: labour market status and occupation 
  Model 1   Model 2 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Dependent variables SPD support   Party identification   SPD support   Party identification 
                        
Hartz dummy -0.209*** (0.021)   -0.124*** (0.015)   -0.320*** (0.045)   -0.216*** (0.030) 
Hartz x Labour market status                       
Unemployed 0.082 (0.067)   -0.172*** (0.044)             
Atypical -0.079 (0.055)   -0.014 (0.038)   -0.062 (0.057)   0.023 (0.039) 
Permanent full-time Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Regular part-time -0.034 (0.046)   -0.103** (0.031)   -0.033 (0.049)   -0.089** (0.033) 
Self-employed 0.168*** (0.049)   -0.017 (0.036)   0.273*** (0.064)   0.086 (0.044) 
Hartz x Occupation                       
Unskilled blue-collar             -0.003 (0.069)   0.028 (0.044) 
Skilled blue-collar             Ref.     Ref.   
Unskilled white-collar             0.112 (0.070)   -0.004 (0.045) 
Skilled white-collar             0.169** (0.055)   0.130*** (0.038) 
Managers/Executives             0.198*** (0.056)   0.160*** (0.041) 
Labour market status                       
Unemployed -0.087** (0.031)   0.113*** (0.022)             
Atypical -0.051 (0.029)   0.105*** (0.020)   -0.094** (0.030)   0.122*** (0.021) 
Permanent full-time Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Regular part-time -0.097*** (0.024)   0.056*** (0.017)   -0.141*** (0.025)   0.067*** (0.017) 
Self-employed -0.578*** (0.025)   0.065*** (0.018)   -0.687*** (0.031)   0.142*** (0.022) 
Occupation                       
Unskilled blue-collar             0.073* (0.029)   -0.014 (0.019) 
Skilled blue-collar             Ref.     Ref.   
Unskilled white-collar             -0.040 (0.031)   0.049* (0.022) 
Skilled white-collar             -0.092*** (0.025)   0.104*** (0.018) 
Managers/Executives             -0.249*** (0.027)   0.145*** (0.020) 
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Table 1   (continued) 
  Model 1   Model 2 
  (1)   (2)   (3)   (4) 
Dependent variables SPD support   Party identification   SPD support   Party identification 
                        
Other socio-economic factors                       
Income -0.002*** (0.000)   0.002*** (0.000)   -0.002*** (0.000)   0.001*** (0.000) 
Union membership 0.506*** (0.017)   0.115*** (0.013)   0.469*** (0.018)   0.143*** (0.013) 
Demographics                       
Age 0.048*** (0.005)   0.026*** (0.003)   0.054*** (0.005)   0.024*** (0.004) 
Age squared -0.050*** (0.006)   -0.014*** (0.004)   -0.057*** (0.006)   -0.012** (0.004) 
Female 0.146*** (0.016)   -0.005 (0.011)   0.164*** (0.017)   -0.026* (0.012) 
Social embeddedness                       
Married       0.077*** (0.011)         0.089*** (0.012) 
Volunteer work       0.163*** (0.010)         0.150*** (0.011) 
Social contacts       0.049*** (0.010)         0.048*** (0.010) 
Political exposure                       
Interest in politics       0.605*** (0.007)         0.587*** (0.007) 
Time to election       -0.042*** (0.007)         -0.048*** (0.007) 
                        
Intercept -1.038*** (0.110)   -2.517*** (0.070)   -1.051*** (0.118)   -2.426*** (0.075) 
Rho-statistic 0.114*** (0.027)         0.035 (0.029)       
Log pseudolikelihood -76026           -70579         
N (N censored) 82016 (41634)         76065 (38278)       
Sample: SOEP, adult West German citizens, active population from the private sector in Model 1, employed in the private sector in Model 2. Notes: Heckman Probit 
Selection Model, adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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5.2. Political divides across occupations 
 
In Model 2, we introduce the occupational dummies and their interaction with the Hartz 
dummy, while we still control for the labour market status.12 There is strong evidence of 
distinct political preferences across the occupational dimension. Looking at the non-interacted 
coefficients from the SPD support equation (column 3), we find skilled WC workers and 
managers/executives to have a lower propensity to support the SPD than skilled BC workers 
(our reference category here) prior to the reform, whereas unskilled BC workers are 
associated with a relatively higher support for the SPD. Only unskilled WC workers do not 
significantly differ from the reference category. 
 
The coefficients for the interaction terms are broadly in line with the literature that defines 
occupational unemployment rates as a strong determinant of preferences for UI. Indeed, 
opposition to the reform was bigger among occupations where we expect unemployment risk 
to be the strongest. They are positive and significant for skilled WC workers and 
managers/executives, which indicates that they were more favourable to the reform than 
skilled BC workers. The substantial positive coefficient for the unskilled WC workers could 
also suggest a smaller aversion to the reform, but it is not significant. Of particular interest, 
the small and insignificant coefficient for unskilled BC workers indicates that they were 
equally reluctant to the reform as skilled BC workers. 
 
Hence, better-off workers from the manufacturing sector were not a driving force behind the 
reform, contrary to claims from the welfare dualisation thesis. As argued earlier, we should 
indeed expect skilled BC workers to have strong preferences for status-securing UI schemes, 
because their skills are specific and are likely to suffer from depreciation in case of prolonged 
unemployment. Because the Hartz reform weakened former status-securing principles of the 
German UI, it went against core interests of this type of workers, which in turn explains 
strong electoral backlash from their side.13 Moreover, the substantive effects of the reform 
implementation are sizeable. Computing the discrete change in the propensity to support the 
SPD during that period (among respondents declaring a party inclination), we find this 
                                                 
12
 Unemployed are dropped in Model 2 and subsequent regressions because we do not have information about 
their occupation. 
13
 Note that due to data limitations we cannot directly test the skill specificity index of Cusack et al. (2006) in 
this paper, while it appears to be a potentially important predictor of preferences beside the measure of 
occupational unemployment rates we use below. 
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propensity to have dropped by about 12.9 percentage points for unskilled BC workers and 
12.6 percentage points for skilled BC workers; by contrast, the drop for unskilled WC 
workers, skilled WC workers and managers/executives was only of 8.4, 6.2 and 4.9 
percentage points respectively.14 Eventually, the SPD lost its comparative electoral advantage 
among BC workers’ constituencies because of the Hartz reform. 
 
Finally, estimates for the occupational interaction terms from the selection equation (column 
4) are comparable to the findings from the SPD support equation.15 The significant and 
negative coefficient for the Hartz dummy indicates a general drop in party identification that 
broadly reflects the impact of the general drop in SPD support. Moreover, this effect is 
significantly smaller for skilled WC workers and managers/executives; this is consistent with 
the fact that these occupations were also more likely to maintain their support for the SPD. 
The coefficient for unskilled BC workers is again not significant, which further suggests that 
unskilled and skilled BC workers were equally opposed to the reform. 
 
6. Secondary results and robustness checks 
 
In this section, we present estimates from various regressions to check the validity of our 
main results (Table 2). For presentation purpose, we only display the coefficients for the 
interaction terms from the SPD support equation, while all these regressions include the same 
controls as in Model 2.16 
 
6.1. Additional explanatory variables 
 
In this paper, we argue that the divergent attitudes toward the Hartz reform between 
occupations prominently arise because of the differences in occupational unemployment rates. 
                                                 
14
 These substantive effects are computed by applying the Average Marginal Effect rule for discrete variables 
(see Table A1.3 in Appendix 3). The substantive drop in the support of skilled and unskilled BC workers is also 
documented in Figure A1.2 (Appendix 6), which depicts descriptive statistics about the yearly evolution of the 
support for the SPD for each occupation. 
15
 The rho statistic becomes insignificant in Model 2, suggesting that the correlation of the error terms in Model 
1 was due to the absence of the occupational dummies. While this indicates that there is no imperative need for a 
bi-variate model once we include these occupational dummies, we stand by this empirical strategy as it might 
marginally improve the estimates accuracy. All the regressions in this paper were re-estimated using simple 
Probit models and they always yielded comparable results (see Table A1.5 in Appendix 5 for instance). 
16
 The coefficients for the controls remain comparable to the one displayed in Model 2 across all of our 
regressions (full coefficients are displayed in Tables A1.6 and A1.7 in Appendix 5). 
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In Model 3, we introduce three variables that could potentially drive our results, while not 
being consistent with that argument. First, we introduce the interaction of the income with our 
Hartz dummy to check if the redistributive motive, rather than the insurance motive, 
determines one’s support for the reform (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Second, we include the 
interacted union membership dummy. The political discrepancies we observe could indeed be 
ascribed to different union density levels across occupations, and consequently to different 
levels of political awareness, in line with arguments from the power-resource literature 
(Korpi, 1983). Because BC workers are traditionally more unionised, this could explain why 
they were more reluctant to the reform. Finally, we introduce a variable that captures 
individual concerns about the state of the economy. One could indeed argue that the decrease 
in SPD support essentially sanctioned the poor economic performances which were 
contemporary with the reform implementation. BC workers and unskilled WC workers being 
presumably more vulnerable to economic downturns, this would explain stronger electoral 
punishment from their side. 
 
Looking at the results from Model 3, we first do not find that people with a higher income 
were more likely to support the reform. The coefficient on the union membership variable is 
lightly significant, but surprisingly it has a positive sign. Hence, this effect goes in the 
opposite direction to the one predicted by power-resource theories: for a given occupation and 
labour market status, political withdrawal was higher among non-unionized workers. 
However, it is questionable whether this result reflects milder opposition from unions’ 
members, or the fact that they were less prone to suddenly turn away from the SPD, given 
their long-standing mutual ties. Finally, we find that individuals with concerns about the state 
of the economy were less prone to support the SPD during its second term than those with no 
concern, this result being very significant for individuals with high concerns. This suggests 
that part of the drop in the popularity of the SPD can be ascribed to the fact that it was held 
responsible for the bad economic performances on that period. Nevertheless, differences 
across occupations remain in Model 3, and we still find BC workers to be more reluctant to 
the reform after introducing these three variables. Therefore, these differences are not fully 
exhausted by these alternative explanations. 
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Table 2   Robustness checks and the impact of occupational unemployment risk. 
  Model 3   Model 4   Model 5   Model 6 
DV : SPD support Alternative factors   Unemployment risk   Smaller timespan   Household context 
                        
Hartz dummy -0.113 (0.106)   0.127 (0.107)   -0.120 (0.111)   -0.073 (0.098) 
Hartz x Labour market status                       
Atypical -0.052 (0.057)   -0.023 (0.057)   -0.095 (0.063)   -0.026 (0.073) 
Permanent full-time Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Regular part-time -0.030 (0.049)   0.009 (0.046)   -0.055 (0.053)   -0.101 (0.075) 
Self-employed 0.275*** (0.067)         0.233** (0.073)   0.331*** (0.058) 
Hartz x Occupational unemployment risk     -0.040** (0.013)             
Hartz x Occupation                       
Unskilled blue-collar 0.019 (0.070)         0.039 (0.077)   0.122 (0.064) 
Skilled blue-collar Ref.           Ref.     Ref.   
Unskilled white-collar 0.131 (0.071)         0.141 (0.078)   0.097 (0.073) 
Skilled white-collar 0.171** (0.057)         0.153* (0.062)   0.210*** (0.050) 
Managers/Executives 0.178** (0.059)         0.146* (0.065)   0.206*** (0.051) 
Hartz x Other socio-economic factors                     
Income 0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
Union membership 0.110* (0.044)   0.081 (0.044)   0.088 (0.049)   0.087* (0.042) 
Hartz x Concerns about the economy                     
No concerns Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Little concerns -0.213* (0.086)   -0.207* (0.086)   -0.214* (0.089)   -0.226** (0.082) 
High concerns -0.389*** (0.087)   -0.379*** (0.086)   -0.243** (0.090)   -0.388*** (0.082) 
                        
Rho-statistic 0.030 (0.029)   0.042 (0.028)   0.092* (0.038)   0.030 (0.027) 
Log pseudolikelihood -70514     -70778     -43568     -81431   
N (N censored) 76065 (38278)   76065 (38278)   47421 (23962)   88122 (44867) 
Sample: SOEP, adult West German citizens, employed in the private sector in Models 3, 4 & 5, employed or with a partner employed in the private sector in Model 6. Notes: 
Heckman Probit Selection Model, adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. Only coefficients for the interactions with the Hartz dummy from the SPD support equation 
are displayed, while all regressions include the same controls as in Model 2 from Table 1. Significance level: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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6.2. Occupational unemployment risk 
 
In Model 4, we directly test the assumption under which occupational unemployment rates is 
the underlying factor that explains the differences between our occupational groups. For that 
purpose we infer unemployment risks at the occupational level from our sample.17 Because 
unemployed in our dataset do not give information about their occupation, we cannot directly 
calculate occupational unemployment rates. Hence, we use its longitudinal design to assess 
occupational unemployment risk. We build our measure as follows. We first calculate the 
proportion of workers that are unemployed in the next (yearly) interview for each 
occupational class. We then average it for all years from our sample (1991-2005), because we 
assume that workers are concerned with the risk of unemployment over the whole business 
cycle when they evaluate their expected gains from the unemployment insurance (and not 
only the actual unemployment rate). For more accuracy, and contrary to precedent 
regressions, we use our occupational classification at its most detailed level and end up with 
11 scores of unemployment risk (one for each occupation).18 We then substitute the 
occupational groups for this measure (and its interaction) in our regression, while we still 
control for the three variables introduced in Model 3. 
 
As expected, the measure of unemployment risk index has a high explanatory power in the 
context of the reform: people belonging to an occupation with higher unemployment 
prospects were less prone to support the SPD when it implemented the Hartz reform, as 
indicated by the negative and significant coefficient on the interacted variable. Besides, the 
estimates of the three control variables are broadly consistent with those from Model 3. Only 
the coefficient for the interacted union membership dummy gets weaker and eventually loses 
significance. 
 
 
                                                 
17
 See Rehm (2009, 2011) for a similar empirical strategy. 
18
 See Table A1.1 in Appendix 1 for the score attached to each occupation. Our results are similar if we use a 
measure of unemployment risks based on the broader occupational categories (5 categories and the self-
employed) used in Model 2. Note that we do not include a self-employed dummy in Model 4 because it is one of 
the occupational categories our employment risk index is built upon. There are concerns that this low 
unemployment risk occupational category might alone drive our result. We check that it is not the case by 
introducing a self-employed dummy (and its interaction) in Model 4: the coefficient for the unemployment risk 
variable eventually gets smaller, but still remains significant at the 1% level (results available upon request). 
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6.3. Shorter time span (1998-2005) 
 
Model 5 provides estimates from an equivalent regression as in Model 3, but on a shorter time 
span. We only use data that covers the two terms of office of the SPD-Green coalition, from 
September 1998 to September 2005. Thus, we can check whether the observed changes in 
attitudes toward the SPD really reflect diverging preferences about the Hartz reform itself, 
and not political trends that were already at work in the first term of the coalition. Our main 
results are robust when we focus on this shorter time span. Coefficients for atypical and part-
time employment remain not significant. While the estimated quantitative effects of the 
occupational status are comparable with those estimated in Model 3, their degree of 
uncertainty has increased, likely because they are based on a smaller number of observations; 
still, the coefficients for skilled WC workers and managers remain significant at the 5% level. 
 
6.4. Cross-household preferences 
 
In a final step, we try to assess possible cross-household preferences for the Hartz reform. As 
already noticed, taking into account cross-household preferences eventually weakens the 
insider-outsider argument. This would indicate that an important share of the outsiders behave 
like insiders, because they give priority to the welfare of their household when they make 
political choices; more specifically, outsiders with an insider partner would support the Hartz 
reform because at the household level expected gains offset the reform costs. This point might 
be particularly relevant in the German context, where there is a strong gender bias in atypical 
employment, especially in Mini-Jobs, a pattern that perpetuates the traditional breadwinner 
family model (Bäcker, 2006). In our sample, women indeed represent about 70% of the 
workers in atypical employment. In addition, we can apply the same line of reasoning for the 
occupational status. If people tend to vote according to the household’s main source of 
income, then we should expect the occupational status of the “breadwinner” to prevail in 
political decisions. Again, this can be very relevant in the German context, where occupations 
strongly differ across gender. For instance, women only represent about 10% of the skilled 
BC workers, while they represent more than 81% of the unskilled WC workers in our sample. 
Moreover, most of these women do not hold a permanent full-time position. 
  
The SOEP dataset allows us to examine this point more deeply, because all household 
members are being interviewed in every wave. We can therefore use this information to build 
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new categories that take into account the partner position (Model 6). Regarding the labour 
market status, individuals are now classified as permanent full-time employed if at least one 
of the spouses holds a full-time open-ended contract. Similarly, they are classified as self-
employed if at least one of the spouses is in full-time self-employment. Those who do not 
meet these requirements (because they do not have a partner or because their partner is not in 
a full-time position) are still classified according to their individual labour market status. 
Regarding the occupational status, individuals without a permanent full-time position are now 
classified according to the occupation of their partner if he or she holds a permanent full-time 
position; otherwise, they remain classified with their own occupation. 
 
The estimates from Model 6 support our main results. The insider-outsider divide stays 
irrelevant to explain attitudes toward the reform, even after we control for household context; 
the atypical employment coefficient remains insignificant for individuals without an insider 
partner. Conversely, differences attached to the occupational status remain. In particular, 
skilled BC workers (and their spouses when they economically depended on them) were 
particularly reluctant to the reform, compared with individuals from households where the 
main source of income is provided by a skilled WC worker or a manager/executive. These 
differences are even sharper, as the coefficients on skilled WC workers and 
managers/executives turn now to be significant at the 0.1% level. Moreover, the coefficients 
for unskilled BC and unskilled WC workers are now positive (while not significant), 
suggesting that skilled BC workers were at least equally reluctant to the reform. Again, this 
speaks against the idea that the Hartz reform implemented an “insider-friendly” set of 
unemployment policies. 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have found little evidence that the Hartz reform was driven by an insider-
outsider political cleavage. If some results potentially suggest that unemployed were 
relatively more reluctant to the reform, this was clearly not the case for atypically employed: 
we do not find significant differences in the behaviour of this group in any of our regressions, 
even when they do not depend financially on an insider partner. Moreover, we find political 
divides among different occupational groups to be much more relevant in the context of the 
Hartz reform. For instance, strong evidence indicates that the Social Democratic Party in 
power lost significant support among BC workers, and in particular skilled BC workers, when 
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it implemented the reform. Again, this result is at odds with claims of an insider-outsider 
cleavage: insiders from the manufacturing sector do not appear to have been pushing for the 
reform. However, it is in line with the literature that emphasizes the role of unemployment 
risks associated with one’s occupation in shaping political preferences for unemployment 
insurance. Using a measure of occupational unemployment risk, we actually find that this risk 
is likely to underlie this result. 
 
Hence, this paper contributes to the debate on the dynamics of European welfare state 
retrenchment. In the German case, it shows that the SPD implemented the reform in spite, and 
not because, of the direct interests of their traditional constituencies: this implied electoral 
backlash from a large share of the labour force, and not only from labour market outsiders in 
atypical employment. The Hartz reform thus appears as an important break in the German 
post-war social pact, which can be traced back to the more general liberalisation process 
experienced by Germany in the last two decades (Streeck, 2009). To conclude, we would like 
to discuss the reach of our conclusions. One could argue that the Hartz reform figures as an 
exception, and we cannot rule out that the insider-outsider cleavage is relevant to explain 
recent UI reforms in other countries. Indeed, we want to acknowledge that the Hartz reform 
presents singular features, because it was implemented under great political and fiscal stress 
and also because it was part of a strategic programmatic shift led by SPD party leaders. It 
entailed substantial cuts in and recalibration of benefits and can therefore be considered as the 
most comprehensive and drastic UI reform undertaken in Europe in recent years. Still, we 
believe that some of our results have general implications. In particular, this paper has shown 
that labour market insiders may also have strong preferences for generous unemployment 
benefits, despite the legal protections associated with their status. Moreover, the Hartz reform 
teaches us that the scope of UI reforms that efficiently isolate insiders from major downside 
effects is limited, because insiders and outsiders have common interests in long-term status-
securing income support schemes and because these vested interests cannot be easily 
disentangled. 
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Appendix 1: Data and measures 
Data: in our empirical analysis, we use the SOEP dataset. Information on data and variables is 
available from the Deutsche Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin) website. We 
define West Germans as individuals with German citizenship and currently living in West 
Germany (old Bundesländer). In Model 1, the 82,016 observations corresponds to 15,603 
distinct individuals; the number of observations per individual ranges from 1 to 15, with a 
median of 4 observations per individual. 
 
Occupation: we use self-reported information to build our 6 occupational categories. The 11 
occupational groups it is based upon are given in the table below, which also depicts the score 
of unemployment risk we use in Model 4. The ‘unskilled BC worker’ category includes 
untrained and trained (on-the-job) BC workers. Likewise, the ‘unskilled WC worker’ category 
includes untrained and trained (on-the-job) WC workers. The ‘skilled BC worker’ category 
includes skilled BC workers (Facharbeiter), foremen and master craftsmen, where all these 
occupations necessitate qualification or vocational training.  The ‘skilled BC worker’ category 
corresponds to qualified professionals (e.g. executive officer, bookkeeper, technical 
draftsman). The ‘manager/executive’ category corresponds to highly qualified professionals 
(e.g. scientist, attorney, head of department) and workers in managerial positions. Finally, the 
‘self-employed’ category also includes family members working for the self-employed. Note 
that the broad division between BC workers, WC workers and self-employed corresponds to 
actual administrative categories, which pertained to distinct social protection regimes (mostly 
pensions) until recently. 
 
Table A1.1   Unemployment risk by occupational group 
Occupational group Unemployment risk 
Unqualified blue-collar worker 7.13% 
Trained blue-collar worker 5.24% 
Skilled blue-collar worker 3.79% 
Foreman 2.18% 
Master Craftsman 3.44% 
Unqualified white-collar worker 4.67% 
Trained white-collar worker 2.93% 
Qualified professional 2.08% 
Highly qualified professional/Executive 1.61% 
Manager 1.66% 
Self-employed 1.02% 
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Income: the measure corresponds to the household pre-tax income, deflated by the German 
consumer prices index provided by national accounts (Destatis) and square-root transformed. 
 
Social embeddedness: married individuals also include those who declare a life partner, while 
not being married. Other questions on social embeddedness depict the frequency to engage in 
social activities. Respondents are being asked: ‘How frequently do you engage in the 
following activities?  volunteer work in clubs, associations, or social services.  visit with friends, relatives, or neighbors.’ 
Answers range from ‘never’ to ‘weekly’. As the category ‘never’ is overrepresented in the 
answers, we instead use dummy variables in our regressions that take the value zero if the 
respondent answered ‘never’, and one otherwise. 
 
Political exposure: the individual’s interest in politics is measured by the following question: 
‘How interested are you in politics?’ The four possible answers range from ‘not interested’ to 
‘very interested’, where we assign the maximum value to the latter. Finally, the temporal 
distance from an election is measured in months and has been log-transformed in order to give 
more weight to the periods very close to Federal Elections. 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics 
Table A1.2   Mean and standard deviation of variables 
  Full sample   Men Women 
  Mean St. deviation   Mean Mean 
Dependent variables           
Overall support 0.492 (0.500)   0.533 0.444 
SPD support 0.214 (0.410)   0.224 0.202 
Labour market status           
Unemployment 0.073 (0.259)   0.069 0.077 
Atypical 0.086 (0.280)   0.046 0.132 
Permanent full-time 0.585 (0.493)   0.741 0.400 
Regular part-time 0.151 (0.358)   0.014 0.314 
Self-employed 0.106 (0.308)   0.130 0.078 
Occupational risk 2.874 (1.561)   2.754 3.017 
Occupation           
Unskilled blue-collar 0.140 (0.347)   0.124 0.160 
Skilled blue-collar 0.164 (0.370)   0.270 0.037 
Unskilled white-collar 0.118 (0.323)   0.041 0.210 
Skilled white-collar 0.250 (0.433)   0.158 0.359 
Managers/Executives 0.150 (0.357)   0.209 0.079 
Other socio-economic factors         
Income (square root) 169.120 (59.806)   171.334 166.494 
Union membership 0.171 (0.377)   0.222 0.111 
Concerns about the economy         
No concerns 0.086 (0.280)   0.092 0.078 
Little concerns 0.543 (0.498)   0.536 0.552 
High concerns 0.371 (0.483)   0.372 0.370 
Demographics           
Age 41.162 (10.797)   41.496 40.765 
Female 0.458 (0.498)   0.000 1.000 
Social embeddedness           
Married 0.754 (0.431)   0.770 0.735 
Volunteer work 0.303 (0.459)   0.332 0.268 
Social contacts 0.423 (0.494)   0.407 0.442 
Political exposure           
Interest in politics 2.288 (0.773)   2.455 2.091 
Time to election 2.219 (0.673)   2.219 2.218 
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Appendix 3: Marginal effect of the Hartz reform on the SPD support  
Table A1.3   Average marginal effects for occupations 
Variation in the support for the SPD by occupation 
 
    
 
Full population -0.078*** (0.006) 
    
 
Unskilled blue-collar workers -0.129*** (0.020) 
Skilled blue-collar workers -0.126*** (0.017) 
Unskilled white-collar workers -0.084*** (0.020) 
Skilled white-collar workers -0.062*** (0.011) 
Managers/Executives -0.049*** (0.012) 
Self-employed -0.012 (0.014) 
 
Appendix 4: Marginal effects of the interaction terms, corrected for non-linearity 
Table A1.4   Marginal effects and standard errors reassessed according to Ai and Norton 
(2003) 
  Model 3   Model 4 
  Alternative factors   Unemployment risk 
            
Hartz x Labour market status           
Atypical -0.017 (0.057)   -0.007 (0.021) 
Permanent full-time Ref.     Ref.   
Regular part-time -0.008 (0.637)   0.005 (0.017) 
Self-employed 0.108*** (0.023)       
Hartz x Occupational unemployment risk     -0.016** (0.005) 
Hartz x Occupation           
Unskilled blue-collar 0.006 (0.026)       
Skilled blue-collar Ref.         
Unskilled white-collar 0.050 (0.027)       
Skilled white-collar 0.065** (0.021)       
Managers/Executives 0.070** (0.022)       
Hartz x Other socio-economic factors         
Income 0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000) 
Union 0.041* (0.017)   0.030 (0.017) 
Hartz x Concerns about the economy         
No concerns Ref.     Ref.   
Little concerns -0.080* (0.033)   -0.078* (0.033) 
High concerns -0.143*** (0.033)   -0.140*** (0.033) 
Sample: SOEP, adult West German citizens, employed in the private sector. Notes: Heckman Probit Selection 
Model, adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses.  Significance level: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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Appendix 5: Additional tables 
Table A1.5   Support for the Hartz reform, simple Profit model and cumulated support for 
both parties in power 
    Simple Probit   Coalition support (Model 3) 
Dependent variables SPD support   SPD+Green support   Party identification 
                    
Hartz dummy -0.103 (0.106)   -0.038 (0.107)   -0.423*** (0.073) 
Hartz x Labour market status               
Atypical   -0.047 (0.057)   0.045 (0.057)   0.031 (0.040) 
Permanent full-time Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Regular part-time -0.027 (0.049)   0.119* (0.049)   -0.089** (0.034) 
Self-employed 0.269*** (0.067)   0.384*** (0.065)   0.029 (0.046) 
Hartz x Occupation                 
Unskilled blue-collar 0.015 (0.070)   -0.000 (0.071)   0.034 (0.045) 
Skilled blue-collar Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Unskilled white-collar 0.126 (0.071)   0.113 (0.072)   -0.023 (0.046) 
Skilled white-collar 0.165** (0.057)   0.173** (0.057)   0.092* (0.039) 
Managers/Executives 0.173** (0.059)   0.288*** (0.059)   0.096* (0.043) 
Hartz x Other socio-economic factors             
Income   0.000 (0.000)   0.000 (0.000)   0.001*** (0.000) 
Union   0.110* (0.044)   0.116* (0.046)   -0.084* (0.033) 
Hartz x Concerns about the economy             
No concerns Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Little concerns -0.217* (0.086)   -0.155 (0.087)   0.140* (0.059) 
High concerns -0.391*** (0.087)   -0.421*** (0.087)   0.099 (0.059) 
Labour market status                 
Atypical   -0.103*** (0.030)   0.021 (0.030)   0.119*** (0.021) 
Permanent full-time Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Regular part-time -0.148*** (0.025)   -0.060* (0.025)   0.065*** (0.017) 
Self-employed -0.697*** (0.030)   -0.432*** (0.030)   0.151*** (0.022) 
Occupation                 
Unskilled blue-collar 0.072* (0.029)   0.039 (0.029)   -0.015 (0.019) 
Skilled blue-collar Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Unskilled white-collar -0.044 (0.031)   -0.031 (0.032)   0.053* (0.022) 
Skilled white-collar -0.097*** (0.025)   0.041 (0.025)   0.111*** (0.018) 
Managers/Executives -0.254*** (0.026)   -0.009 (0.027)   0.155*** (0.020) 
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Table A1.5   (continued) 
    Simple Probit   Coalition support (Model 3) 
Dependent variables SPD support   SPD+Green support   Party identification 
                    
Other socio-economic factors               
Income   -0.002*** (0.000)   -0.002*** (0.000)   0.001*** (0.000) 
Union membership 0.445*** (0.020)   0.519*** (0.021)   0.162*** (0.015) 
Concerns about the economy               
No concerns Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Little concerns 0.040 (0.026)   -0.058* (0.026)   -0.024 (0.019) 
High concerns 0.021 (0.027)   -0.141*** (0.027)   -0.073*** (0.020) 
Demographics                 
Age   0.054*** (0.005)   0.073*** (0.005)   0.025*** (0.004) 
Age squared -0.057*** (0.006)   -0.091*** (0.006)   -0.013** (0.004) 
Female   0.169*** (0.017)   0.253*** (0.017)   -0.025* (0.012) 
Social embeddedness                 
Married               0.086*** (0.012) 
Volunteer work             0.140*** (0.011) 
Social contacts             0.047*** (0.010) 
Political exposure                 
Interest in politics             0.592*** (0.007) 
Time to election             -0.049*** (0.007) 
                    
Intercept   -1.010*** (0.110)   -0.885*** (0.119)   -2.373*** (0.077) 
Rho-statistic       -0.149*** (0.029)       
Log pseudolikelihood -24383     -70818         
N (N censored) 37819     76065 (38278)       
Sample: SOEP, adult West German citizens, employed in the private sector. Notes: adjusted robust standard 
errors in parentheses. Significance level: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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Table A1.6   Models 3 and 4 from Table 1.2, full coefficients 
  Model 3   Model 4 
  Alternative factors   Unemployment risk 
Dependent variables SPD support   Party identification   SPD support   Party identification 
Hartz dummy -0.113 (0.106)   -0.420*** (0.073)   0.127 (0.107)   -0.342*** (0.077) 
Hartz x Labour market status                       
Atypical -0.052 (0.057)   0.029 (0.040)   -0.023 (0.057)   0.035 (0.039) 
Permanent full-time Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Regular part-time -0.030 (0.049)   -0.090** (0.034)   0.009 (0.046)   -0.084** (0.032) 
Self-employed 0.275*** (0.067)   0.029 (0.046)             
Hartz x Occupational unemployment risk           -0.040** (0.013)   -0.016 (0.009) 
Hartz x Occupation                       
Unskilled blue-collar 0.019 (0.070)   0.035 (0.045)             
Skilled blue-collar Ref.     Ref.               
Unskilled white-collar 0.131 (0.071)   -0.023 (0.046)             
Skilled white-collar 0.171** (0.057)   0.092* (0.039)             
Managers/Executives 0.178** (0.059)   0.096* (0.043)             
Hartz x Other socio-economic factors                     
Income 0.000 (0.000)   0.001*** (0.000)   0.000 (0.000)   0.001*** (0.000) 
Union membership 0.110* (0.044)   -0.085* (0.033)   0.081 (0.044)   -0.082* (0.032) 
Hartz x Concerns about the economy                     
No concerns Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Little concerns -0.213* (0.086)   0.139* (0.059)   -0.207* (0.086)   0.140* (0.059) 
High concerns -0.389*** (0.087)   0.097 (0.059)   -0.379*** (0.086)   0.098 (0.059) 
Labour market status                       
Atypical -0.100*** (0.030)   0.119*** (0.021)   -0.085** (0.030)   0.130*** (0.021) 
Permanent full-time Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Regular part-time -0.146*** (0.025)   0.065*** (0.017)   -0.087*** (0.024)   0.069*** (0.017) 
Self-employed -0.692*** (0.031)   0.152*** (0.022)             
Occupational unemployment risk           0.100*** (0.006)   -0.036*** (0.004) 
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Table A1.6   (continued) 
Dependent variables SPD support   Party identification   SPD support   Party identification 
Occupation                       
Unskilled blue-collar 0.070* (0.029)   -0.015 (0.019)             
Skilled blue-collar Ref.     Ref.               
Unskilled white-collar -0.044 (0.031)   0.053* (0.022)             
Skilled white-collar -0.094*** (0.025)   0.111*** (0.018)             
Managers/Executives -0.249*** (0.027)   0.155*** (0.020)             
Other socio-economic factors                       
Income -0.002*** (0.000)   0.001*** (0.000)   -0.002*** (0.000)   0.001*** (0.000) 
Union membership 0.448*** (0.020)   0.163*** (0.015)   0.514*** (0.019)   0.150*** (0.014) 
Concerns about the economy                       
No concerns Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Little concerns 0.038 (0.026)   -0.024 (0.019)   0.047 (0.026)   -0.028 (0.019) 
High concerns 0.019 (0.027)   -0.074*** (0.020)   0.025 (0.027)   -0.079*** (0.020) 
Demographics                       
Age 0.054*** (0.005)   0.025*** (0.004)   0.051*** (0.005)   0.026*** (0.004) 
Age squared -0.058*** (0.006)   -0.013** (0.004)   -0.056*** (0.006)   -0.014*** (0.004) 
Female 0.165*** (0.017)   -0.024 (0.012)   0.169*** (0.016)   -0.012 (0.011) 
Social embeddedness                       
Married       0.091*** (0.012)         0.087*** (0.012) 
Volunteer work       0.150*** (0.011)         0.149*** (0.011) 
Social contacts       0.047*** (0.010)         0.048*** (0.010) 
Political exposure                       
Interest in politics       0.591*** (0.007)         0.595*** (0.007) 
Time to election       -0.050*** (0.007)         -0.049*** (0.007) 
Intercept -1.055*** (0.120)   -2.369*** (0.077)   -1.417*** (0.119)   -2.245*** (0.080) 
Rho-statistic 0.030 (0.029)         0.042 (0.028)       
Log pseudolikelihood -70514           -70778         
N (N censored) 76065 (38278)         76065 (38278)       
Sample: SOEP, adult West German citizens, employed in the private sector. Notes: Heckman Probit Selection Model, adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance level: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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Table A1.7   Models 5 and 6 from Table 1.2, full coefficients 
  Model 5   Model 6 
  Smaller timespan   Household context 
Dependent variables SPD support   Party identification   SPD support   Party identification 
                        
Hartz dummy -0.120 (0.111)   -0.320*** (0.078)   -0.073 (0.098)   -0.501*** (0.067) 
Hartz x Labour market status                       
Atypical -0.095 (0.063)   0.027 (0.043)   -0.026 (0.073)   0.057 (0.050) 
Permanent full-time Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Regular part-time -0.055 (0.053)   -0.065 (0.037)   -0.101 (0.075)   0.012 (0.051) 
Self-employed 0.233** (0.073)   0.000 (0.051)   0.331*** (0.058)   0.060 (0.040) 
Hartz x Occupation                       
Unskilled blue-collar 0.039 (0.077)   0.045 (0.049)   0.122 (0.064)   0.063 (0.041) 
Skilled blue-collar Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Unskilled white-collar 0.141 (0.078)   -0.000 (0.050)   0.097 (0.073)   -0.006 (0.045) 
Skilled white-collar 0.153* (0.062)   0.074 (0.042)   0.210*** (0.050)   0.103** (0.034) 
Managers/Executives 0.146* (0.065)   0.071 (0.047)   0.206*** (0.051)   0.118** (0.036) 
Hartz x Other socio-economic factors                     
Income 0.000 (0.000)   0.001* (0.000)   0.000 (0.000)   0.001*** (0.000) 
Union membership 0.088 (0.049)   -0.085* (0.036)   0.087* (0.042)   -0.078* (0.031) 
Hartz x Concerns about the economy                     
No concerns Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Little concerns -0.214* (0.089)   0.135* (0.061)   -0.226** (0.082)   0.166** (0.055) 
High concerns -0.243** (0.090)   0.079 (0.062)   -0.388*** (0.082)   0.134* (0.055) 
Labour market status                       
Atypical -0.035 (0.039)   0.107*** (0.027)   -0.112** (0.038)   0.119*** (0.027) 
Permanent full-time Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Regular part-time -0.114*** (0.034)   0.042 (0.024)   -0.165*** (0.036)   0.104*** (0.025) 
Self-employed -0.644*** (0.044)   0.185*** (0.031)   -0.726*** (0.027)   0.110*** (0.019) 
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Table A1.7   (continued) 
Dependent variables SPD support   Party identification   SPD support   Party identification 
Occupation                       
Unskilled blue-collar 0.046 (0.043)   -0.023 (0.028)   0.034 (0.026)   -0.016 (0.017) 
Skilled blue-collar Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Unskilled white-collar -0.042 (0.045)   0.020 (0.031)   -0.055 (0.031)   0.006 (0.021) 
Skilled white-collar -0.053 (0.036)   0.120*** (0.025)   -0.139*** (0.021)   0.079*** (0.015) 
Managers/Executives -0.205*** (0.038)   0.184*** (0.028)   -0.278*** (0.023)   0.137*** (0.017) 
Other socio-economic factors                       
Income -0.002*** (0.000)   0.001*** (0.000)   -0.001*** (0.000)   0.001*** (0.000) 
Union membership 0.465*** (0.029)   0.170*** (0.021)   0.465*** (0.019)   0.161*** (0.014) 
Concerns about the economy                       
No concerns Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Little concerns 0.042 (0.033)   -0.018 (0.024)   0.047 (0.024)   -0.027 (0.017) 
High concerns -0.128*** (0.037)   -0.051 (0.027)   0.034 (0.026)   -0.079*** (0.018) 
Demographics                       
Age 0.061*** (0.007)   0.009 (0.005)   0.049*** (0.005)   0.023*** (0.003) 
Age squared -0.062*** (0.008)   0.004 (0.005)   -0.053*** (0.005)   -0.012** (0.004) 
Female 0.125*** (0.022)   -0.005 (0.016)   0.135*** (0.013)   -0.004 (0.010) 
Social embeddedness                       
Married       0.091*** (0.015)         0.107*** (0.012) 
Volunteer work       0.146*** (0.014)         0.133*** (0.010) 
Social contacts       0.050*** (0.013)         0.050*** (0.009) 
Political exposure                       
Interest in politics       0.598*** (0.009)         0.596*** (0.007) 
Time to election       -0.031** (0.010)         -0.050*** (0.007) 
Intercept -1.323*** (0.156)   -2.177*** (0.103)   -0.964*** (0.111)   -2.337*** (0.072) 
Rho-statistic 0.092* (0.038)         0.030 (0.027)       
Log pseudolikelihood -43568           -81431         
N (N censored) 47421 (23962)         88122 (44867)       
Sample: SOEP, adult West German citizens, employed in the private sector in Model 5, employed or with a partner employed in the private sector in Model 6. Notes: 
Heckman Probit Selection Model, adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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Table A1.8   Socio-economic determinants of the support for the Hartz reform, East Germany 
  Model 1 East   Model 2 East 
Dependent variables SPD support   Party identification   SPD support   Party identification 
                        
Hartz dummy -0.194*** (0.045)   -0.081** (0.026)   -0.256** (0.081)   -0.144*** (0.044) 
Hartz x Labour market status                       
Unemployed -0.292** (0.102)   -0.145** (0.053)             
Atypical -0.032 (0.127)   -0.141* (0.069)   -0.031 (0.130)   -0.132 (0.071) 
Permanent full-time Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Regular part-time -0.073 (0.116)   -0.128 (0.066)   -0.082 (0.120)   -0.108 (0.068) 
Self-employed 0.108 (0.117)   0.055 (0.066)   0.165 (0.135)   0.122 (0.074) 
Hartz x Occupation                       
Unskilled blue-collar             0.039 (0.161)   0.086 (0.081) 
Skilled blue-collar             Ref.     Ref.   
Unskilled white-collar             0.093 (0.147)   -0.036 (0.077) 
Skilled white-collar             0.089 (0.111)   0.050 (0.062) 
Managers/Executives             0.116 (0.106)   0.160* (0.065) 
Labour market status                       
Unemployed -0.029 (0.041)   0.015 (0.024)             
Atypical -0.067 (0.053)   -0.003 (0.031)   -0.051 (0.054)   0.026 (0.032) 
Permanent full-time Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     Ref.   
Regular part-time 0.019 (0.052)   0.097** (0.031)   0.029 (0.053)   0.103** (0.032) 
Self-employed -0.590*** (0.055)   0.095** (0.031)   -0.663*** (0.060)   0.092** (0.034) 
Occupation                       
Unskilled blue-collar             -0.110 (0.059)   -0.147*** (0.032) 
Skilled blue-collar             Ref.     Ref.   
Unskilled white-collar             -0.092 (0.056)   -0.014 (0.032) 
Skilled white-collar             -0.053 (0.046)   -0.013 (0.027) 
Managers/Executives             -0.156*** (0.046)   0.070* (0.030) 
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Table A1.8   (continued) 
  Model 1 East   Model 2 East 
Dependent variables SPD support   Party identification   SPD support   Party identification 
                        
Other socio-economic factors                       
Income -0.001** (0.000)   0.001*** (0.000)   -0.001 (0.000)   0.001*** (0.000) 
Union membership 0.240*** (0.028)   0.027 (0.017)   0.244*** (0.031)   0.016 (0.019) 
Demographics                       
Age -0.004 (0.009)   -0.003 (0.005)   -0.014 (0.010)   0.003 (0.006) 
Age squared 0.017 (0.011)   0.016* (0.006)   0.028* (0.012)   0.008 (0.007) 
Female -0.005 (0.027)   -0.018 (0.015)   -0.002 (0.033)   -0.004 (0.019) 
Social embeddedness                       
Married       0.042* (0.020)         0.046* (0.022) 
Volunteer work       0.153*** (0.017)         0.134*** (0.019) 
Social contacts       0.099*** (0.018)         0.094*** (0.020) 
Political exposure                       
Interest in politics       0.619*** (0.011)         0.598*** (0.012) 
Time to election       -0.061*** (0.012)         -0.066*** (0.013) 
                        
Intercept -0.598** (0.203)   -2.156*** (0.115)   -1.051*** (0.118)   -2.426*** (0.075) 
Rho-statistic 0.052 (0.042)         0.001 (0.050)       
Log pseudolikelihood -27131           -22345         
N (N censored) 36343 (24576)         29443 (19621)       
Sample: SOEP, adult East German citizens, active population from the private sector in Model 1, employed in the private sector in Model 2. Notes: Heckman Probit Selection 
Model, adjusted robust standard errors in parentheses. Significance level: *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. 
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Appendix 6: Additional figures 
Figure A1.1   Evolution of the support to the main political parties in East Germany (1992-
2008) 
 
Sample: SOEP, East German citizens, adult population. Author’s calculations. 
 
Figure A1.2   Evolution of the support to the SPD by occupations (1992-2008) 
 
Sample: SOEP, West German citizens, employed population in the private sector. Author’s calculations. 
 
 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.19
